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This work investigates the presence and sources of economies of scope in R&D at U.S. research 
universities. The analysis evaluates the tradeoffs and synergies arising between traditional 
university research outputs (articles and doctorates) and academic patents. We propose a new 
measure of economies of scope based on a primal representation of the underlying technology. 
We derive a decomposition of economies of scope which identifies its sources (e.g., 
complementarity effects and scale effects). Non-parametric estimates of scope economies using 
R&D input and output data from 92 research universities show significant economies of scope 
between articles and patents, but modest complementarities. (JEL O3, O31, O33, C6, L31) 
 
Research and development (R&D) are fundamental to technological progress and 
economic growth. Because universities are dedicated to the production and dissemination of new 
knowledge and new technologies, university spillovers and their effects on economic growth 
have been the subject of much interest (e.g., Adam Jaffe, 1989; Rebecca Henderson et al., 1998; 
Bronwyn H. Hall et al., 2003b; Lee Branstetter, 2003; Suzanne Scotchmer, 2004). In the early 
1980s, changes in federal policies, starting with the Bayh-Dole Act, made it easier for U.S. 
universities to retain the property rights to inventions obtained from federally funded research. 
This broad institutional change in intellectual property rights, combined with recent tightening in 
state and federal budgets, have helped to increase university efforts to secure both research 
sponsorship and intellectual property right royalties from the private sector.  
Over the last ten years, academic patenting in the U.S. has increased sharply (Jeremy D. 
Foltz et al., 2005).  University tech transfer offices, many recently established, intensified their 
  1efforts to secure property rights to new knowledge and to transfer their research findings to the 
private sector through licensing arrangements, start-ups, and other remunerative arrangements. 
These efforts have raised a wide range of questions about the changing role of public and private 
research universities in the economy, society, and the pursuit of knowledge (e.g., Pierre Azoulay 
et al., 2004; Lee Branstetter, 2003; Bronwyn H. Hall et al., 2003b; Rebecca Henderson et al., 
1998; Richard A. Jensen and Marie C. Thursby, 2001; Bhaven Sampat et al., 2003). One key 
issue is the existence of possible synergies between patenting and more traditional university 
outputs; i.e. the existence and nature of economies of scope within research universities.  
Following the pioneering work by William J. Baumol et al. (1982), economies of scope 
measure the benefit for a firm to produce multiple outputs. Measuring such benefits for 
universities has provided useful insights into their organizational structure (e.g., Elchanan Cohn, 
et al., 1989; Hans De Groot et al., 1991; G. Thomas Sav, 2004). But, does the diversification of 
research universities into patenting activities generate significant synergies? In principle, 
university patenting and private-public partnering activities can help research universities 
become more effective in stimulating innovations (e.g., Hall et al., 2003b). However, at this 
point, the nature and magnitude of these benefits remain unclear. How large are these benefits? 
And how are they distributed among universities of different sizes or different types (e.g., private 
versus public universities)?  
This paper investigates the presence and sources of economies of scope in R&D 
production at U.S. research universities. The analysis addresses the following issue in the 
literature on academic patenting: whether synergies arise between traditional university research 
outputs (articles and doctorates) and the more recent and burgeoning output of academic patents. 
Framing the empirical analysis requires a theoretical exposition of the concept of economies of 
  1scope that deepens our understanding of this phenomenon in ways that are relevant not only to 
R&D processes but also to the many other economic contexts where scope economies may arise. 
Overall, our paper makes three methodological contributions.  
First, the conventional approach to measuring economies of scope typically involves 
analyzing complete specialization among outputs (see Baumol et al., 1982). This is relevant in 
the evaluation of mergers and acquisitions when firms are deciding on whether to produce jointly 
distinctive outputs or to spin off separate operations. However, universities are rarely completely 
specialized. On that basis, we develop an analysis that allows for partial specialization between 
production processes. Allowing for partial specialization permits a search for economies of scope 
across a more nuanced range of possible outcomes than is typically depicted in previous 
economies of scope studies.  
The second methodological contribution of this paper is to develop and apply a primal 
approach to economies of scope. The approach relies on David G. Luenberger’s (1995) shortage 
function as a representation of the underlying technology. This primal approach is especially 
useful in measuring scope economies in contexts where input cost data are difficult to obtain or 
fraught with measurement problems, such as in our empirical study with respect to certain input 
prices that shape university research and teaching outputs.  
The third and perhaps most far-reaching contribution of this paper is its decomposition of 
economies of scope into three measures: complementarities between outputs, economies of scale 
in multiple outputs (along different degrees of specialization), and a convexity component. This 
decomposition provides a clear picture of the basis for scope economy outcomes in production of 
multiple outputs, because it permits identification of whether the scale of operation and/or the 
complementarity of outputs are driving scope benefits. This decomposition extends the 
  2contributions of Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1990) by making identification of 
complementarity and other sources of scope economies both more tractable and intuitive. Our 
empirical analysis of U.S. research universities illustrates how both scale and complementarity 
can drive scope outcomes for economic entities as their size and type change.   
Finally, our scope analysis is applied to U.S. research universities. This provides 
evidence on the synergies that exist between patenting and more traditional academic research 
outputs.  R&D input and output data from 92 top-tier U.S. research universities are used to 
estimate economies of scope for public and private universities of different sizes. The estimates 
are obtained using a non-parametric representation of the underlying technology, and control for 
quality of article and patent outputs. The empirical results show that significant variations exist 
in the magnitude and sources of economies of scope across U.S. universities. Indeed, while scope 
economies are evident in most of the sample, evidence for strong complementarity among these 
research activities is more limited.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the basic model and a 
characterization of firms going from integrated, to mildly specialized, to fully specialized output 
choices. Section 3 proposes a new primal measure of scope economies based on Luenberger’s 
(1995) shortage function. Section 4 presents a decomposition of scope economies which 
identifies the potential sources of scope benefits among outputs. Section 5 discusses the dataset 
on university research outputs and inputs. Using a non-parametric approach, section 6 applies 
our proposed methodology to estimate scope economies and their sources across a spectrum of 
specialization for U.S. research universities. Section 7 reports the empirical results, and section 8 
concludes.  
 
  3I. The Model 
Consider a firm facing a production process producing m outputs using n inputs, where y 
= (y1, …, ym) ∈ R
m
+  is the vector of outputs, and x ∈ R  is the vector of inputs. Using the netput 
notation (where inputs are negative and outputs are positive), the netputs are z ≡ (-x, y). The 
technology is represented by the production possibility set F ⊂ R ×R , where z ≡ (-x, y) ∈ F 
means that outputs y can be produced from inputs x.  Throughout the paper, we assume that the 
set F is closed and with a non-empty interior. We want to investigate under what conditions the 
multiproduct firm would gain (or lose) from reorganizing its production activities in a more 
specialized way. The reorganization involves breaking up the firm into K specialized firms, 2 ≤ 







A1, IA2, …, IAK, IB}, 
where IA = {IA1, IA2, …, IAK}, IAk being the set of outputs that the k-th firm is specializing in, k = 




k) denote the outputs produced by the k-th specialized firm, k = 1, …, K.  
Our analysis of the economics of specialization has two objectives in mind. First, we 
explore what happens under alternative specialization schemes holding total output constant. 
This requires selecting the outputs of specialized firms such that ∑  y
K
1 k=
k = y, where the K 
specialized firms produce the same aggregate output vector y as the original firm. Second, we 
want to allow various degrees of specialization, going from “mild specialization” to “complete 
specialization”. In this context, given y = (y1, …, ym), consider the following patterns of 
specialization for the k-th firm 
(1a)  yi
k = β yi, if i ∈ IAk, 
(1b)                                             = yi (1-β)/(K-1), if i ∈ IAk’, k’ ≠ k, 
(1c)                                             = yi/K, if i ∈ IB, 
  4for some β, 1/K < β ≤ 1, k = 1, …, K. This represents a reorganization of the original firm into K 
firms toward greater specialization, where the k-th firm becomes more specialized in the 
production of outputs in the sets IAk, k = 1, …, K.  
Note that the specification (1a)-(1c) always satisfies ∑  y
K
1 k= i
k = yi, i = 1, …, m. This 
guarantees that the same aggregate outputs are being produced before and after the firm 
reorganization. The parameter β in (1a) represents the proportion of the original outputs {yi: i ∈ 
IAk} produced by the k-th firm. And from (1b), (1-β) represents the proportion of the original 
outputs {yi: i ∈ IAk’, k’ ≠ k} produced by the k-th firm. When β = 1, this means that the k-th firm 
produces the same quantities {yi: i ∈ IAk} as the original firm and that such outputs are produced 
only by the k-th firm. In this case, the k-th firm is completely specialized in the production of the 
outputs in the set IAk (and it produces none of the other outputs in the sets IA). Alternatively, 
when 1/K < β < 1, we allow for partial specialization. For example, if K = 2 and β = 0.9, then the 
first firm (corresponding to k = 1) produces 90% of the quantities {yi: i ∈ IA1} produced by the 
original firm, while the second firm (corresponding to k = 2) produces the remaining 10%. And 
the second firm (k = 2) produces 90% of the quantities {yi: i ∈ IA2} produced by the original 
firm, while the first firm (k = 1) produces the remaining 10%. Finally, note that (1c) allocates the 
outputs in the set IB equally among the K specialized firms. This simply reflects that the outputs 
in I
B
B are not involved in the patterns of specialization as the firm reorganizes.  
Equations (1a)-(1c) include as a special case the situation where β = 1 and IB =  ∅. This 
is the case of complete specialization (e.g., as investigated by Baumol et al., 1982 based on a cost 
function). As such, our approach extends previous analyses in two directions. First it allows for 
specialization in a subset of outputs (when IB ≠ ∅). This can become relevant in the economics 
of specialization when 2 ≤ K < m, i.e., when the number of specialized firms is less than the 
  5number of outputs. Second, as noted above, it allows for partial specialization in the outputs of 
the set IA (with 1/K < β < 1). This is relevant when the K firms want to explore the economics of 
becoming more specialized (thus deemphasizing the production of some of their outputs) but 
without a complete shutdown of some of their production lines.  
 
II. Economies of Scope 
To investigate the economics of specialization, we need to rely on measures that can be 
meaningfully added across firms. This is the case of the cost function which has provided the 
standard basis for measuring economies of scope. In this context, Baumol et al. (1982) have 
defined economies of scope (diseconomies of scope) as situations where it is less costly (more 
costly) to produce the aggregate outputs y from an integrated firm as compared to specialized 
firms. This has stimulated empirical analyses of the benefit (or cost) of producing from an 
integrated multi-output firm. However, the cost function requires that all inputs be market goods 
with observable prices. There are situations where some inputs have prices that are not 
observable or that do not reflect their marginal contribution to the production process. An 
example in higher education includes Ph.D. students: their cost to a university can differ 
significantly from their marginal contribution to university research productivity. Under such 
scenarios, the use of the cost function becomes problematic. But under the convexity assumption, 
it is well known that the cost function is dual to the underlying technology. This means that there 
are alternative ways of measuring economies of scope directly from the production technology. 
Like the cost function, this requires using a measurement of the production technology that can 
be meaningfully added across firms. A measurement that satisfies this property is Luenberger’s 
  6shortage function, which we use below in our analysis of the scope economies associated with 
integrated production.  





(2)     σ(z, g) = minγ {γ : (z - γ g) ∈ F} if (z - γ g) ∈ F for some scalar γ, 
= +∞ otherwise. 
The shortage function σ(z, g) in (2) measures how far the point z is from the frontier of 
technology, expressed in units of the reference bundle g. To illustrate, consider the case where g 
= (0, …, 0, 1). Then, the shortage function is σ(z, g) = minγ {γ: (z1, …, zm-1, zm - γ) ∈ F} = zm - 
f(z1, …, zm-1), where f(z1, …, zm-1) is a (multi-output) production frontier, and feasibility implies 
that zm ≤ f(z1, …, zm-1). Under differentiability, this implies that ∂σ/∂zi = -∂f/∂zi, i.e. that the 
marginal shortage ∂σ/∂zi is the negative of the marginal product ∂f/∂zi with respect to the i-th 
netput, i = 1, …, m-1. Note that, given a reference bundle g, the shortage function can be 
meaningfully added across firms. As such, the shortage function provides a convenient basis for 
analyzing scope issues and the benefit/cost of specialization.
１  
Starting from a firm using netputs z ≡ (-x, y), we analyze whether there are any benefits 
from reorganizing its production activities according to equation (1), where y
k ∈ R  is produced 






k. If the k-th firm uses inputs x
k, the 




k, g). In a way similar to (1c), consider the 
case where inputs x are equally divided between the K firms, with x
k = x/K, k = 1, …, K.  
Definition 1: Given equations (1), economies of scope (diseconomies of scope) with respect to 
the partition I = {IA1, …, IAK, IB} in the production of outputs y are said to exist if  
  7(3)   S(β, IA1, …, IAK, IB, z, g) ≡ ∑ σ(-x/K, y =
Κ
1 k
k, g) - σ(z, g) > (<) 0, 
 
Note that  σ(-x/K, y ∑ =
K
1 k
k, g) can be interpreted as the smallest distance to the 
technology frontier (as measured by the number of units of the reference bundle g) when the 
aggregate netputs z = (-x, y) are produced by K specialized firms: (-x/K, y
k), k = 1, …, K. Thus, 
equation (3) compares the distance to the technology frontier producing y from an integrated 
firm versus specialized firms.  
 To help interpret (3), consider the case where netputs are market goods with prices p ∈ 
R . Then, starting from the aggregate netput z and under technical efficiency, π
m n+
+ + a = p ⋅ [z - σ(-
x, y, g) g] is the profit for the integrated firm, while πs = p ⋅ [ z ∑ =
K
1 k
k - σ(-x/K, y
k, g) g] is the 
aggregate profit for the K specialized firms, where z
k = (-x/K, y
k), and y
k satisfies (1), k = 1, …, 
K. It follows that the difference in profit is  
πa - πs = [∑ σ(-x/K, y =
K
1 k
k, g) - σ(-x, y, g)] p ⋅ g, 
where (πa - πs) measures the benefit of integrated production in a multiproduct firm. When 
positive, this difference reflects positive synergy among outputs. Given p ⋅ g > 0, this makes it 
clear that S(β, IA1, …, IAK, IB, z, g) > 0 in (3) corresponds to economies of scope, identifying the 
presence of synergies or positive externalities in the production process among the outputs in IAk, 
k = 1, …, K. Alternatively, diseconomies of scope exist (with S(β, IA1, …, IAK, IB, z, g) < 0) if 
producing netputs z from an integrated firm (as opposed to K specialized firms) reduces the 
benefits. This identifies the presence of negative externalities in the production process among 
the outputs in IAk, k = 1, …, K.  
  8How does S in (3) compare with the traditional cost-based measure of scope proposed by 
Baumol et al. (1982)?  They define economies of scope when S’ ≡  C(r, y ∑ =
K
1 k
k) - C(r, y) > 0, 
where r is the input price vector and C(r, y) = minx {r ⋅ x: (-x, y) ∈ F) is the cost function. 
Consider the case where g = (gx, 0), and x is the cost-minimizing input bundle under outputs y: x 
∈ argminx’ {r ⋅ x’: (-x’, y) ∈ F}. Note that cost minimization implies that C(r, y
k) ≤ r ⋅ [x/K - σ(-
x/K, y
k, gx) gx]. For given input prices r, it follows that S’ = ∑ C(r, y =
K
1 k





k, gx) gx] = (r ⋅ gx) S. When input prices are normalized such that r ⋅ gx = 1, this 
implies that S’ ≤ S: the Baumol scope measure S’ is a lower bound on S in (3). This reflects 
possible allocative inefficiencies when x/K does not minimize the cost of producing y
k, k = 1, .., 
K. Alternatively, if r ⋅ gx = 1 and x/K did minimize the cost of producing each y
k, then S’ = S and 
the two scope measures become identical. Of course, this is conditional on input prices r. In 
situations where input prices are difficult to assess, then only the primal measure S in (3) remains 
empirically tractable.  
 
III. A Decomposition of Economies of Scope 
For simplicity, we focus our attention on the case of splitting the original firm (which 
produces the output vector y) into two firms (K = 2).
２ Then, with the partition I = {IA1, IA2, IB}, 
the first firm (k = 1) specializes in the outputs in IA1, the second firm (k = 2) specializes in the 
outputs in IA2, and y = (yA1, yA2, yB), where yA1 = {yi: i ∈ IA1}, yA2 = {yi: i ∈ IA2}, yA = (yA1, yA2), 
and yB = {yi: i ∈ IB} are the remaining outputs. From equations (1), it follows that y
1 = (β yA1, 
(1-β) yA2, ½ yB), and y
2 = ((1-β) yA1, β yA2, ½ yB).  
A useful decomposition of S in (3) is presented next. See the proof in Appendix A.  
  9Proposition 1: Assume that the shortage function σ(z, g) is continuous in z and differentiable 
almost everywhere in y ∈ R . Under equations (1) with K = 2, there are economies of scope in 
the production of outputs y = (y
m
+
A1, yA2, yB) ∈ R  if and only if  
m
+ +
S(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) ≡ SC(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) + SR(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) 
(4)                                                      + SV(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) > 0,   B
where 
SC(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) ≡ - [∂σ/∂γ(-½ x, β y ∫ −
A2
A2
y   β
y   β) (1
A1, γ, ½ yB, g) 
(5a)                                                           - ∂σ/∂γ(-½ x, (1-β) yA1, γ, ½ yB, g)] dγ,  
(5b)                   SR(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) ≡ 2 σ(½ z, g) - σ(z, g), 
               SV(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) ≡ σ(-½ x, β yA, ½ yB, g) + σ(-½ x, (1-β) yA, ½ yB, g) 
(5c)                                                   - 2 σ(½ z, g).  
 
Proposition 1 gives a necessary and sufficient condition for economies of scope in the 
production of outputs y. Equation (4) decomposes the scope measure S(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) in (3) 
into three additive terms: SC(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) given in (5a), SR(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) given in 
(5b), and SV(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) given in (5c).  
The term SC in (5a) depends on how yA1 affects the marginal shortage of yA2. As 
illustrated in section 3, marginal shortage can be interpreted as the negative of the marginal 
product. With this interpretation in mind, given β ∈ (0.5, 1], we define complementarities 
between yA1 and yA2 at point y as any situation where the shortage function σ(z, g) satisfies 
[∂σ/∂yA2(-½ x, β yA1, γ yA2, ½ yB, g) - ∂σ/∂yA2 (-½ x, (1-β) yA1, γ yA2, ½ yB, g)] ≤ 0 for all γ ∈ [0, 
1], with the inequality being strict over a set of nonzero measure. Then, it is clear from (5a) that 
  10SC > 0 if the shortage function exhibits complementarities between yA1 and yA2. Thus, the term 
SC can be interpreted as reflecting the role of complementarities between yA1 and yA2 in 
economies of scope.   
Note that when, the shortage function σ(z, g) is twice differentiable in y ∈ R , then S
m
+ C in 
(5a) can be alternatively written as  
(5a’)  SC ≡ - ∂ ∫ −
A2
A2
y   β
y   β) (1 ∫ −
A1
A1
y   β
y   β) (1
2σ/∂γ1∂γ2(-½ x, γ1, γ2, ½ yB, g) dγ1 dγ2. 
When β ∈ (0.5, 1], equation (5a’) makes it clear that the sign of SC depends on the sign of 
∂
2σ/∂yA1∂yA2. This shows that, under twice differentiability, complementarities can be defined as 
any situation where ∂
2σ/∂yA1∂yA2(-½ x, γ1 yA1, γ2 yA2, ½ yB, g) ≤ 0 for all γi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, 
with the inequality being strict over a set of nonzero measure. Recall that the term ∂σ/∂yi can be 
interpreted as the negative of the marginal product with respect to yi. Thus, when ∂
2σ/∂yA1∂yA2 < 
0, complementarities mean that yA1 has positive effects on the marginal product of yA2, implying 
positive synergies between yA1 and yA2 (see Baumol et al., 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).  
To interpret the term SR in (5b), using lemma 1 in Appendix A, note that 2 σ(½ z, g) <, =, 
or > σ(z, g) under decreasing return to scale (DRTS), constant return to scale (CRTS), or 
increasing return to scale (IRTS), respectively. It follows that  



























Equation (5b’) implies that SR vanishes under CRTS, but is positive (negative) under IRTS 
(DRTS). Thus, the term SR can be interpreted as capturing scale effects generated as the output 
vector y is produced by more specialized firms. Also, equation (5b’) shows that SR ≥ 0 under 
non-decreasing returns to scale.  
  11Finally, the term SV(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) in (5c) reflects the effect of convexity. From 
lemma 2 in Appendix A, if the technology F is convex, the shortage function σ(z, g) is convex in 
z and satisfies σ(θ z + (1-θ) z’, g) ≤ θ σ(z, g) + (1-θ) σ(z’, g) for any  θ ∈ [0, 1] and any z and z’. 
Choosing θ = ½, it follows that SV(β, IA1, IA2, IB, z, g) ≥ 0 under a convex technology. In other 
words, a convex technology is sufficient to imply that SV ≥ 0. In addition, note that SV = 0 when β 
= 0.5. Thus, under a convex technology, one can expect SV to increase with the degree of 
specialization β ∈ [0.5, 1].   
The decomposition provided in Proposition 1 indicates that there can be multiple sources 
of economies of scope. Identifying the role played by each source appears useful as it can 
provide useful insights into the economics of specialization. This is illustrated next in an 
application to U.S. universities.    
 
IV. Data 
The dataset combines information on research inputs and outputs in the sciences and 
engineering for 92 US universities, including 61 public universities and 31 private universities 
for the period of 1995-1998. This dataset contains for all 92 universities the following data:  
1) Total patent counts and patent citations from all science and engineering fields (U.S. 
Patent Office, 2004; and Hall et al., 2003a),  
2) Article counts and citations from all science and engineering fields (ISI Web of 
Science, 2004),  
3) Total number of doctorates and bachelor degrees granted in the sciences as well as the 
number of graduate students, faculty, and post-docs (National Science Foundation, 2004).  
  12Further details on the sources of the data and key choices in the construction of the 
dataset can be found in Appendix B. One key aspect of the dataset warrants discussion here. The 
dataset focuses on scientific inputs and outputs, reflecting our interest in studying economies of 
scope between university research and university patents. Thus, our measures of scientific inputs 
and outputs are appropriate to investigate the possible tradeoff that exists between university 
research outputs and university patents (which are almost entirely produced by the sciences).   
In order to proceed with the empirical analysis, we need a representation of the university 
production process. In the case of student training, we measure undergraduate bachelor’s degrees 
in the sciences as university outputs. However, graduate students can be both inputs and outputs: 
they are outputs of the university educational function; but they are also inputs into the research 
process (especially through their theses and dissertations). To account for this dual function of 
graduate students, we assume that they are outputs, except in their final year when they are 
treated as inputs into the university research process. Since there is typically a one or two year 
delay between when research takes form as an article or patent and when a graduate student 
worked on it, we think that our assumption is a reasonable match with the output data we have. 
Thus, we measure continuing graduate students as outputs, and PhD’s granted as inputs. In this 
context, universities are involved in the production of four outputs (journal articles, patents, 
trained undergraduate students, and trained graduate students) using three inputs (faculty, post-
doctoral researchers, and PhD graduate students). 
To account for quality differentials, quality adjustments are made on university output 
measures of patents and articles as well as input measure of faculty. Quality-adjusted output 
measures are obtained, where citations of articles and patents are used to control for quality of 
those two research outputs. Quality-adjusted input measure for faculty is obtained by multiplying 
  13total faculty numbers and the university’s average faculty salary (National Science Foundation, 
2004). Science patent assignee and citation information were obtained from the NBER patent 
database (Hall et al., 2003a), while the Science Citation Index (ISI Web of Science, 2004) 
provided the science article and citation counts by year for each university. Patents are credited 
by application year rather than by grant date in order to measure them as close as possible to the 
date research efforts occurred. Quality adjustments were sought because in the case of research 
output, quality is likely to matter significantly to the implicit value of the research and also to the 
potential synergies between patents and articles. In the first case, highly cited articles and patents 
are likely to generate flows of additional research or licensing funds to the author or assignee, 
while in the latter research that gives rise, for example, to an article that is highly cited may also 
be more likely to generate a patent than would a larger number of un-cited articles. Empirically, 
studies of patent citations have shown that they provide a reasonable proxy for both the quality 
of a patent and knowledge spillovers from patents, because each time a new patent uses a piece 
of research from another patent it is obligated to cite the previous patent (Henderson et al., 
1998). Article citations are also commonly used as measures of quality in studies of departmental 
or university quality (e.g., Amy Adams, 1998).
    
  Using citations as a quality measure requires attending to the time dependency of the 
counts, namely the truncation problem associated with more recent articles or patents that may 
not have had time to generate many citations (Sampat et al., 2003).  The quality adjustment 
measure used for each life science article/patent is the deviation from the average citation rate of 
an article/patent in the same broad class/category published in the same year. For example, a 
1995 biochemistry article with 10 citations is compared to the average level of citations of all 
biochemistry articles produced in that year. For a given year, the average article within a 
  14category has a citation rate of 1, with higher quality articles then having a measure greater than 
one and lower quality articles receiving a measure between zero and one. This relative citation 
approach minimizes a truncation bias that would be introduced by using an absolute citation 
count. Further details on the citation measure are provided in Appendix B. 
Finally, we account for the fact that the production process for universities is dynamic: 
the process of scientific discovery is typically time-consuming. For example, lagged inputs can 
affect current outputs in the presence of production lags (e.g., it takes time for research to be 
published). And lagged outputs may affect current outputs in the presence of temporal synergies 
in production. This implies a need to incorporate dynamics in the representation of the 
underlying technology. This is done by specifying and estimating a multi-period production 
technology over a four-year period. Outputs for the current year are assumed to depend on inputs 
of the current year, but also on inputs and outputs from the three previous years. The effects of 
lagged quantities are captured by a weighted average of the corresponding quantities, with 
weight equal to 0.5 for lag one-year, 0.37 for lag two-years, and 0.13 for lag three-years. As a 
result, our dynamic production process is represented by eight outputs (four current outputs and 
four lagged outputs) and six inputs (three current inputs, and three lagged inputs). Our empirical 
investigation of economies of scope between university research outcomes (patents and articles) 
relies on data for 1995-1998 (the most recent years with complete data available).  
 
V. Empirical Analysis 
The shortage function described in equation (2) provides a generic representation of the 
frontier of technology. It can be estimated either using parametric methods (involving a 
parametric specification followed by an econometric estimation of the parameters) or non-
  15parametric methods. Below, we rely on a non-parametric approach for several reasons. First, it 
provides a flexible representation of the multi-output production frontier. Second, it does not 
require imposing a parametric structure on the problem. Third, when the number of netputs is 
large, it is not subject to collinearity problems. Finally, it does not require that each data point be 
on the frontier technology, which allows for possible technical inefficiencies (see Foltz et al., 
2005).  
Thus, we use input and output data to recover an estimate of the underlying multi-output 
production technology for universities. Again, this is done by representing the dynamic process 
of producing outputs (research articles, patents, undergraduate degrees granted, and graduate 
students (excluding final-year doctorates)) using a set of inputs (post-docs, doctorates in their 
final year of study, and faculty). And using the shortage function in (2), we have measurements 
of how far is each point from the production frontier. 
Next, a nonparametric representation of economies of scope is investigated. To assess 
economies of scope between research articles and patents, we break up the original university 
into 2 specialized universities. We then identify the following partition I: IA1 = patents, IA2 = 
research articles, IB = doctoral students in labs and bachelor degrees. This partition corresponds 
to scenarios of increasing specialization, where one university may specialize in patents while 
another in research publications. Note also that doctoral students in labs and bachelor degrees are 
included in the set of outputs that no particular firm specializes in. As shown in section 3, 
B
economies of scope (diseconomies of scope) with respect to the partition I = {IA1, IA2, IB} are 
defined as in equation (3).   
Evaluating equation (3) requires the estimation of the shortage function under alternative 
scenarios. This requires first choosing a reference bundle g that will be the same under each 
  16scenario. Our chosen reference bundle g = (g1, …, gn+m) involves choosing gi = 1 for current and 
lagged faculty input, gi = 0.00513 for current and lagged post-docs, gi = 0.00335 for current and 
lagged doctorates in their final year of study, and gi = 0 otherwise. The numbers 0.00513 and 
0.00335 are the ratios of post-docs per faculty, and of final-year doctorates per faculty, evaluated 
at sample means. The choice gi = 1 for faculty means that our reference bundle can be interpreted 
as a typical input bundle associated with one faculty. Here faculty is measured in terms of 
(adjusted) faculty salary. With all shortage measurements being made in terms of units of this 
reference bundle g, it follows that such measurements can be interpreted in terms of changes in 
faculty salaries, with proportional adjustments in post-docs and final-year doctorates. This 
provides a simple and logical measure of the distance from the frontier technology under 
alternative scenarios. A strength of this approach, as opposed to a dual counterpart (a cost 
function approach), is that the price information of some major inputs (e.g., post-docs, doctorates 
in their final year of study) are not required to assess economies of scope.  
The non-parametric estimation of the technology and the associated shortage function is 
done as follows. Following  Sidney Afriat (1972), Hal R.Varian (1984) and others, given a set of 
observations on T universities, z
t ≡ (-x
t, y
t), t = 1, …, T, a nonparametric representation of the 
technology under variable return to scale (VRTS) is F
v = {z:  λ ∑ =
T
1 t t z
t ≥ z,  λ ∑ =
T
1 t t = 1, λt ≥ 0, t 
= 1, …, T}. In general, the set F
v is convex and satisfies (-x
t, y
t) ∈ F
v, t = 1, …, T. It does not 
require that all firms be technically efficient. Indeed, while technically efficient firms are 
necessarily located on the boundary of F
v, it allows for technically inefficient firms (located in 
the interior of F
v).  Finally, it allows for increasing, constant, as well as decreasing return to 
scale. Then, given F
v, a nonparametric estimate of the shortage function under VRTS is 
(6)  σ(-x, y, g) = minγ,λ { γ:  λ ∑ =
T
1 t t z
t ≥ z - γ g,  λ ∑ =
T
1 t t = 1, λt ≥ 0, t = 1, …, T}. 
  17This is standard linear programming problem.
３ It can be solved for different values of z 
≡ (-x, y). For example, when evaluated at y
k and x/2 (as given in (1) where  y ∑ =
2
1 k
k = y), this 
yields σ(-x/2, y
k, g). This provides the information required to evaluate economies of scope S (as 
given in equation (3)).  
From proposition 1, we have shown that S can be decomposed into three additive parts 
(see equation (4)). The parts associated with scale effects (SR in equation (5b)) and convexity 
effects (SV in equation (5c)) can be easily obtained from (6) evaluated at appropriate netput levels 
z. The part associated with complementarity effects (SC in (5a)) can be recovered from equation 
(4) by subtracting SR and SV from our scope measure S. This provides all the information 
necessary to both evaluate economies of scope S in (3) as well as its decomposition given in (4) 
and (5).  
Finally, the analysis can be conducted with various degree of specialization. Since the 
complete shutdown of any operation in university production is not plausible, we will focus our 
attention on partial specialization scenarios where 1/2 < β < 1.  
 
VI. Results and Implications 
In general, economies of scope reflect properties of the underlying technology. This 
means that, for a given feasible set F, any two universities using/producing similar netputs would 
exhibit the same economies of scope. Yet, there is much heterogeneity among universities both 
in terms of size and scope. In this context, a small university and a large university are located at 
different points of the feasible set F. Similarly, some universities are more specialized than 
others, which again locate them at different points of the underlying technology. Thus, given the 
flexible representation of the technology F allowed by estimating it non-parametrically, 
  18economies of scope is likely to vary depending on the point of evaluation. For example, it may 
be that the nature of complementarities between outputs varies between small universities and 
large universities at different degrees of specialization.  Thus, rather than compare the actual 
estimates, to facilitate comparisons across university types and sizes in the following scenario, 
we control for the degree of specialization in academic research outputs.  Specifically, we first 
choose a point of partial integration (β = 0.8), and construct scope estimates and their 
decomposition for 52 universities which are on the production frontier - 36 public and 16 private 
– (see Appendix B, Table B-1 for a complete listing). Then, in several figures below, we explore 
how the level and sources of scope vary with different degrees of integration-specialization in 
production of patents and articles. 
The economy of scope estimates associated with integrated production of academic 
patents and research articles are constructed using equations (3) and (6) from above. These 
estimates are then decomposed into their complementarity, scale, and convexity components 
using equations (4) and (5). Scope benefits are measured relative to faculty input: S/Fac. Given 
that the reference bundle g represents one “unit of faculty”, this measures the proportion of 
faculty that can be saved by producing university outputs in a relatively integrated fashion 
(compared to more specialized schemes, β = 1.0). Similarly, the decompositions of scope into 
complementarity, scale and convexity effects are measured relative to faculty input: SC/Fac, 
SR/Fac, and SV/Fac, respectively. From (5b’), the SR estimate is positive, zero, or negative under 
IRTS, CRTS, or DRTS, respectively. We briefly discuss the patterns revealed from the 52 
university estimates reported in Appendix table B-1 in order to set the context for a comparison 
of estimates for a representative sample of private and public universities that are depicted in 
Table 1 and Figures 1-4 below. 
  19On average, scope estimates for both public and private universities are positive (0.26, 
0.56), respectively.  Sources of scope vary notably across university types, but several general 
patterns can be identified.  One is that for public and private universities that are relatively small, 
their main source of scope comes from the scale component (See a listing of the universities in 
this category in Appendix B, Table B-1).  This result is not surprising given that the scope 
simulation design divides the universities in two to compare how they would do as separate units 
with relatively more specialization in patents or articles.  Scale is also the main source for scope 
estimates for the private universities, which are on average smaller than public ones.  A second 
important pattern is that only 4 of the 52 universities show strong evidence of complementarity 
as a lead source of scope in this specific scenario of partial integration (β = 0.8).  Finally, there is 
a group of eight large public universities for which the scope estimates are effectively zero, or 
slightly negative, because the scale component contributes negatively to their scope estimates.  
This heterogeneity in the degree of scope and its sources are depicted in Table 1 and 
explored further in Figures 1-4 for seven public universities and six private universities.  These 
universities were chosen on the following basis: 1/ each is on the production frontier; 2/ each is 
involved in significant levels of patenting; and 3/ together, they offer a cross-section 
representation of universities with respect to type (public vs. private), size, and extent of and 
sources of scope.  As shown in Table 1, the proportion S/Fac varies from -0.037 (for Texas A&M 
University) to 1.038 (for Caltech). As in the larger sample data, the scope estimates in Table 1 
reflect the finding that economies of scope are prevalent between patents and more traditional 
university outputs. Table 1 also illustrates the finding that the relative measures of S/Fac vary 
systematically across universities with these estimates being larger for smaller universities and, 
accordingly, for private universities.   
  20As Table 1 illustrates, sources of scope vary substantially across universities.  The 
relative complementarity measure SC/Fac varies from -0.007 (for Dartmouth) to 0.264 (for MIT). 
The complementarity estimates are positive and small for most universities. This indicates the 
presence of some positive but small synergies between research publications and university 
patenting. For example, for the University of California-Irvine and Stanford University, the 
complementarity benefits amount to less than 1 percent of the faculty input. At the other extreme, 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, University of Texas-Austin, and MIT exhibit relatively 
large complementarity benefits amounting to 11-26 percent of faculty input. This range indicates 
that, while complementarity benefits can be large for some universities, they are not necessarily 
so for all universities.  
From Table 1, we can also see that some universities exhibit substantive positive 
economies of scope estimates but little complementarity between publication and patents (e.g., 
University of California-Irvine and Dartmouth). In this case, economies of scope must come 
from sources other than complementarity, i.e. from the scale component SR and/or the convexity 
component SV. The relative scale component SR/Fac reported in Table 1 shows that scale effects 
are indeed important. In general, the larger universities exhibit a negative SR/Fac and thus are 
operating in the region of decreasing returns to scale, while smaller universities are operating in 
the region of increasing returns to scale with positive estimates for SR/Fac. For example, Table 1 
shows that SR/Fac varies from -0.174 (for University of Michigan) to 0.621 (for Dartmouth). This 
means that “being too large” (e.g., University of Michigan) can actually contribute to 
diseconomies of scope (SR < 0). Alternatively, “being too small” (e.g., Dartmouth) contributes to 
economies of scope (SR > 0), but perhaps in a manner that is less easily exploited (as increasing a 
university’s size markedly may be more difficult than adjusting the mix of outputs). In this case, 
  21small universities (e.g., University of California-Irvine, Dartmouth) can exhibit economies of 
scope in the absence of complementarity because of scale effects. Additionally, some universities 
operating close to the region of constant returns to scale are associated with small SR/Fac (e.g., 
University of California-Berkeley, University of Wisconsin-Madison). Finally, the relative 
convexity component SV/Fac reported in Table 1 varies between 0.017 (for Texas A&M) and 
0.546 (for Johns Hopkins). As expected, it is non-negative under a convex technology. The 
results indicate that the degree of convexity of the technology also varies substantially across 
evaluation points.  
Additional estimates of relative economies of scope are presented in Figures 1 and 2. 
Figure 1 depicts for selected public universities how the relative scope measure S/Fac varies with 
the degree of specialization, β. In general, scope benefits increase with the degree of 
specialization, which demonstrates that the incentives of selected universities to take advantage 
of such benefits by combining patenting and article producing activities are most evident under 
scenarios associated with high degrees of specialization.  However, note that this tendency also 
varies across universities. This increase in scope benefits is found to be modest for the University 
of California-Irvine, but quite large for the University of Michigan. Figure 2 depicts similar 
estimates for selected private universities. Figure 2 illustrates that the relative scope benefits 
S/Fac increase with β, strongly so for some universities (e.g., Johns Hopkins) but only mildly so 
for others (e.g., Dartmouth). Again, it appears that the benefits of integration across outputs 
depend on the degree of specialization.  
Additional information on complementarity effects is presented in Figures 3 and 4 for 
public and private universities, respectively.  These figures depict how the relative 
complementarity component SC/Fac varies with the degree of specialization β ∈ [0.5, 0.8]. Since 
  22SC = 0 when β = 0.5, we find in general that SC/Fac tends to increase with β. Again, this indicates 
that complementarity effects tend to be larger when comparing a university as an integrated firm 
with two more highly specialized firms. This is true for public universities as well as private 
universities.  However, the patterns differ between public and private universities.  For the 
former, except for the University of California-Irvine (for which changing β has little impact), 
SC/Fac tends to increase significantly as β rises, reflecting the strong potential for exploiting the 
apparent complementarity between publications and patents by producing them in an integrated 
fashion. As shown in Figure 3, the rate of increase is particularly high for the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison for β ≥ 0.7, and for the University of Texas-Austin. For these two 
universities, the productivity gains due to publication-patent complementarities appear to be 
especially large when evaluated at a level above β ≥ 0.7, corresponding to a high degree of 
specialization.  Figure 4 shows that the relative complementarity effects SC/Fac are small for all 
private universities when β ∈ [0.5, 0.65]. Except for Johns Hopkins and MIT, they remain small 
for private universities (including here Cal Tech, Stanford, and Northwestern) as the degree of 
specialization β rises. Only above β > 0.7 for MIT does there appear to be large scope economies 
attributable to complementarity between articles and patents. Overall, these estimates suggest 
that the benefits of complementarity vary markedly across universities as well as degree of 
specialization, and that complementarities between articles and patents contribute significantly to 
scope benefits only for selected universities. 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
We have presented an economic analysis of scope economies at US universities, with a 
focus on the decomposition of economies of scope evaluated directly from the technology. We 
  23first developed a conceptual model allowing for the investigation of economies of scope in a 
primal framework where the benefits of producing from an integrated firm can be measured 
directly from the technology of university production, using Luenberger’s shortage function. 
This measure covers both the case of complete specialization (typically found in previous 
literature on economies of scope) and the case of partial specialization (suitable for investigating 
economies of scope in university production). Further, this approach allows for a decomposition 
of economies of scope into three additive parts measuring scale effects, complementarity effects 
and convexity effects. Relying on a non-parametric approach, we first recovered the production 
technology of 92 US universities using 1995-1998 data, and evaluated the associated 
Luenberger’s shortage function. Then, measures of economies of scope and their decomposition 
results are obtained and analyzed.  
Our analysis uncovered several important findings. First, we find that economies of scope 
are prevalent between patents and more traditional university outputs. Second, we documented 
how economies of scope measures of US universities during the 1995 to 1998 period vary with 
university size. We find that economies of scale (diseconomies of scale) associated with small 
(large) universities contribute to generating economies (diseconomies) of scope. Third, we 
uncovered evidence that complementarity effects are size-sensitive and vary across universities. 
We found large complementarity benefits between research articles and patents for a few 
universities, both private (MIT) and public (University of Texas-Austin, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison). However, such complementarity effects are found to be negligible for 
small universities, as well as many large universities. This suggests that synergies between 
articles and patents exist but are not widespread within the academic community. Fourth, our 
decomposition of scope effects into scale component, complementarity component and 
  24convexity component provides useful information on the sources of scope benefits. For example, 
we found that scope effects tend to be important for small universities because of scale effects 
(and not because of complementarity effects). However, for the large public/private universities, 
scale effects tend to be smaller, while complementarity effects can become more important.   
Our analysis suggests a need for future research to evaluate whether economies of scope 
may have changed over time. Also, our finding that economies of scope and complementarities 
can vary a lot across universities raises the question: what factors contribute to the presence of 
scope economies and complementarities in the research activities at U.S. universities? That 
undertaking appears challenging, because at the core of the university research mission is the 
creative process of inquiry, discovery, invention, and innovation. For example, given the 
complexities involved in the dynamic production of new knowledge, identifying why major 
complementarities in research activities arise for some universities (e.g., MIT or the University 
of Wisconsin-Madison) and not others may be quite difficult. Nonetheless, exploring such issues 
has considerable value, even if it could only identify that some complementarity and scope 
benefits may not be easily transferable across universities. Finally, while this paper focused on 
the presence and sources of scope economies at U.S. research universities, it would be useful to 
undertake similar analyses of other multiproduct industries (e.g., the banking industry, R&D in 
life sciences, the food industry, and environmental management). 
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UNIV MICHIGAN  138,736 0.105 0.060  -0.174  0.219
UNIV TEXAS AUSTIN  131,748 0.162 0.115  -0.007  0.054
MICHIGAN STATE UNIV  120,453 -0.051 0.059  -0.132  0.022
TEXAS A&M UNIV  109,692 -0.037 0.003  -0.057  0.017
UNIV CALIF BERKELEY  100,450 0.179 0.063  0.005  0.112
UNIV WISCONSIN MADISON  91,804 0.227 0.117  0.012  0.098
UNIV CALIF IRVINE  44,792 0.200 0.008  0.143  0.049
Private Universities    
STANFORD UNIV  80,592 0.270 0.007  0.049  0.214
MIT 80,223 0.684 0.264  0.154  0.266
NORTHWESTERN UNIV  70,883 0.109 0.040  -0.024  0.093
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV  61,116 0.549 0.084  -0.081  0.546
CALTECH 30,181 1.038 0.011  0.594  0.433
DARTMOUTH COLL  25,823 0.647 -0.007  0.621  0.032
 
 
  29Figure 1: Relative Economies of Scope (S/Fac) at Selected Public Universities by Degree of 
Specialization (β) 
 




















































































































































































































  33Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 1: From equation (4), economies of scope are defined as 
S ≡ σ(-½ x, β yA1, (1-β) yA2, ½ yB, g) + σ(-½ x, (1-β) yA1, β yA2, ½ yB, g)  
- σ(x, y, g) > 0.  
When σ(z, g) is continuous in z and differentiable almost everywhere in y, this can be 
alternatively written as  
S = - [∂σ/∂γ(-½ x, β y ∫ −
A2
A2
y   β
y   β) (1
A1, γ, ½ yB, g) - ∂σ/∂γ(-½ x, (1-β) yA1, γ, ½ yB, g)] dγ  
+ σ(-½ x, β yA, ½ yB, g) + σ(-½ x,(1-β) yA, ½ yB, g) - 2 σ(½ z, g), 
+ 2 σ(½ z, g) - σ(-x, y, g).  
 



























Proof: By definition, the technology exhibits increasing return to scale (IRTS), constant return to 
scale (CRTS), or decreasing return to scale (DRTS) when, for all α > 1, α F ⊂ F, α F = F, 
or α F ⊃ F, respectively. Let k ∈ (0, 1). Consider the case where there is a γ satisfying (k 
z - γ g) ∈ F. Then 
σ(k z, g) = minγ {γ: (k z - γ g) ∈ F},  










































  34Lemma 2: The shortage function σ(z, g) is convex in z if F is a convex set.   
Proof: Consider any two netput vectors z ∈ R
n+m and z’ ∈ R
n+m. First assume that σ(z, g) and 
σ(z’, g) are finite. It follows that (z - σ(z, g) g) ∈ F and (z’ - σ(z’, g) g) ∈ F. Let z” = θ z 
+ (1-θ) z’, for any scalar θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. If the set F is convex, it follows that 
[z” - θ σ(z, g) g - (1-θ) σ(z’, g) g] ∈ F. 
The shortage function being defined as a minimum in (2), this yields 
σ(z”, g) = σ(θ z + (1-θ) z’, g) ≤ θ σ(z, g) + (1-θ) σ(z’, g). 
Second, consider the case where σ(z, g) and/or σ(z’, g) are infinite. Then, the above 
inequality always holds. This shows that the shortage function σ(z, g) is convex in z 
when F is a convex set. 
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Patents 
Patent data were culled from the NBER patent database, where they were identified as 
having a university assignee.  Patents assigned to the University of California system were 
associated with a campus (Berkeley, Davis, Los Angeles, etc.) by the location of their authors 
through searches of campus directories.  Relative citations for patents were generated by year 
and by patent class comparing each individual patent to the universe of all patents in that class 
(whether owned by universities or not).  A university’s patent count for that year is then adjusted 







patents Patents Adjusted Quality × =  
where the number of expected citations, E(citations) is calculated as the number of citations that 
same portfolio of patents would receive if each patent received the average citation rate for its 
US patent class for that year.   
 
Articles 
Article data were culled from the ISI-Web of Science database based on universities 
included in their “University Science Indicators” and categories established in that same 
document.  The Web of Science includes only the major journals in a field as identified by 
impact factors, such that our article measures necessarily cut out articles written for lesser 
journals.  In addition the citation measures are only for citations in other major journals.  This 
truncation, we believe serves our purposes of adding a subtle quality measure even to our 
quantity measures.  Articles listed in all science disciplines were chosen. 
Relative citations for articles were generated by category compared to citations of other 
articles assigned to the universities in the sample, rather than to all articles, and these measures 
were constructed annually.   The same techniques of generating relative citations used for patents 
were used for articles. 
 
Universities included in the sample:  
Arizona State U., Boston U., Brandeis U., Brown U., Caltech, Carnegie Mellon U., Case 
Western Reserve U., Colorado State U., Cornell U., Dartmouth College, Emory U., Florida State 
  36U., Georgetown U., Georgia Inst. of Technology., Harvard U., Indiana U., Iowa State U., Johns 
Hopkins U., Lehigh U.,  Loyola U., Michigan State U., MIT, N Carolina State U., New Mexico 
State U.,  Northwestern U., Ohio State U., Oregon State U., Penn State U., Princeton U., Purdue 
U., Rice U., Stanford U., Syracuse U., Texas A&M U., Tufts U., U. Alabama, U. Alaska, U. 
Arizona, U. C. Berkeley, U. C. Davis, U. C. Irvine, U. C. Los Angeles, U. C. Riverside, U. C. 
San Diego, U. C. Santa Barbara, U. C. Santa Cruz, U. Chicago, U. Cincinnati, U. Colorado, U. 
Connecticut, U. Delaware, U. Florida, U. Georgia, U. Hawaii, U. of Illinois Chicago, U. Illinois 
Urbana, U. Iowa, U. Kansas, U. Kentucky, U. Maryland Baltimore, U. Maryland College 
Park, U. Miami, U. Michigan, U. Minnesota, U. Missouri, U. N. Carolina Chapel Hill, U. 
Nebraska, U. New Hampshire, U. New Mexico, U. Oregon, U. Penn, U. Pittsburgh, U. 
Rochester, U. So Calif, U. Tennessee, U. Texas Austin, U. Texas Houston, U. Utah, U. 
Vermont, U. Virginia, U. Washington, U. Wisconsin Madison, Utah State U., Vanderbilt 
U., Virginia Polytech Inst, W. Virginia U., Wake Forest U., Washington State U., Washington 
U., Wayne State U., Yale U., Yeshiva U. 
 
  37Table B-1: Relative scope measure (S/Fac) and its decomposition into complementarity 
component (SC/Fac), scale component (SR/Fac), and convexity component (SV/Fac) for 52 











Private Universities   
 BOSTON  UNIV  0.186 0.007 0.098  0.081
 BRANDEIS  UNIV  1.021 0.000 1.021  0.000
 CALTECH  1.038 0.011 0.594 0.433
 DARTMOUTH  COLL  0.647 -0.007 0.621  0.032
 EMORY  UNIV  0.362 -0.003 0.285  0.080
 GEORGETOWN  UNIV  0.245 -0.012 0.204  0.054
 HARVARD  UNIV  1.314 0.017 0.022  1.275
  JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV  0.548 0.084 -0.081  0.546
 MIT  0.684 0.264 0.154  0.266
 NORTHWESTERN  UNIV  0.109 0.040 -0.024  0.093
 STANFORD  UNIV  0.270 0.007 0.049  0.214
 TUFTS  UNIV  0.271 0.001 0.214  0.056
 UNIV  PITTSBURGH  0.076 0.023 -0.104  0.156
  UNIV SO CALIF  0.147 0.001 0.127  0.019
  WAKE FOREST UNIV  0.824 -0.003 0.816  0.011
 YESHIVA  UNIV  1.273 -0.003 1.260  0.016
  AVERAGE 0.56 0.03 0.33  0.21
Public Universities   
  ARIZONA STATE UNIV  -0.003 0.006 -0.011  0.002
 FLORIDA  STATE  UNIV  0.009 0.008 -0.007  0.007
 GEORGIA  INST  TECHNOL  0.333 -0.005 0.307  0.031
 INDIANA  UNIV  0.019 0.000 -0.007  0.026
  MICHIGAN STATE UNIV  -0.051 0.059 -0.132  0.022
  NEW MEXICO STATE UNIV  0.343 0.000 0.339  0.003
  N CAROLINA STATE UNIV  0.068 0.023 0.006  0.039
 OHIO  STATE  UNIV  -0.080 0.027 -0.162  0.054
 OREGON  STATE  UNIV  0.477 -0.013 0.461  0.029
  PENN STATE UNIV  0.094 0.051 -0.035  0.078
  TEXAS A&M UNIV  -0.037 0.003 -0.057  0.017
 UNIV  ALABAMA  0.173 0.020 0.114  0.039
 UNIV  COLORADO  0.134 -0.001 0.103  0.032
 UNIV  FLORIDA  0.011 0.041 -0.095  0.065
 UNIV  ILLINOIS  URBANA  -0.040 0.032 -0.177  0.104
 UNIV  MICHIGAN  0.105 0.060 -0.174  0.219
 UNIV  MINNESOTA  0.112 0.026 -0.104  0.191
  UNIV NEW HAMPSHIRE  0.459 0.000 0.459  0.000
 UNIV  OREGON  0.381 0.000 0.380  0.001
 UNIV  TENNESSEE  0.092 0.011 0.014  0.067
  38  UNIV TEXAS HOUSTON  1.242 0.000 1.203  0.039
  UNIV TEXAS AUSTIN  0.162 0.115 -0.007  0.054
 UNIV  UTAH  0.210 0.026 0.139  0.045
 UNIV  WASHINGTON  0.318 0.102 -0.024  0.240
 UNIV  WISCONSIN  MADISON  0.227 0.117 0.012  0.098
 UNIV  ALASKA  1.458 0.000 1.458  0.000
 UTAH  STATE  UNIV  0.366 0.000 0.364  0.002
 UNIV  VERMONT  0.566 0.000 0.561  0.005
  W VIRGINIA UNIV  0.219 0.000 0.219  0.000
 UNIV  CALIF  BERKELEY  0.180 0.063 0.005  0.112
 UNIV  CALIF  DAVIS  0.168 0.015 0.081  0.072
 UNIV  CALIF  IRVINE  0.200 0.008 0.143  0.049
  UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES  0.245 0.047 0.010  0.188
  UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO  0.386 0.036 0.149  0.201
 UNIV  CALIF  SANTA 
BARBARA 
0.222 -0.012 0.175 0.059
  UNIV CALIF SANTA CRUZ  0.604 0.000 0.601  0.003
  AVERAGE 0.26 0.02 0.18  0.06
* 9 private universities with dominant scale components: BRANDEIS UNIV, CALTECH, DARTMOUTH COLL, 
EMORY UNIV, GEORGETOWN UNIV, TUFTS UNIV, UNIV SO CALIF, WAKE FOREST UNIV 
YESHIVA UNIV  
* 15 public universities with dominant scale components: GEORGIA INST TECHNOL, NEW MEXICO STATE 
UNIV, OREGON STATE UNIV, UNIV ALABAMA, UNIV COLORADO, UNIV NEW HAMPSHIRE, UNIV 
OREGON, UNIV TEXAS HOUSTON, UNIV UTAH, UNIV ALASKA, UTAH STATE UNIV, UNIV VERMONT,  
W VIRGINIA UNIV, UNIV CALIF IRVINE, UNIV CALIF SANTA BARBARA, UNIV CALIF SANTA CRUZ 
* 4 universities with strong evidence of complementarity as a source of scope: MIT, UNIV TEXAS AUSTIN, UNIV 
WASHINGTON, UNIV WISCONSIN MADISON 
* 8 larger public universities with zero or negative scope estimates: ARIZONA STATE UNIV,  
FLORIDA STATE UNIV, INDIANA UNIV, MICHIGAN STATE UNIV, N CAROLINA STATE UNIV,  
TEXAS A&M UNIV, UNIV FLORIDA, UNIV ILLINOIS URBANA 
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１ Note that other measures have been developed in the literature. They include the directional 
distance function Dg(z, g) discussed by Robert G. Chambers, Yangho Chung, and Rolf Färe and 
Rolf Färe, and Shawna Grosskopf: Dg(z, g) ≡ maxβ {β: (z + β g) ∈ F}. Since it satisfies σ(z, g) = 
-Dg(z, g), it should be clear that the analysis presented below could be presented equivalently 
using the directional distance function. Other measures include Shephard’s output distance 
function DO(z) ≡ minθ {θ: (-x, y/θ) ∈ F}, and Shephard’s input distance function DI(z) ≡ maxθ 
{θ: (-x/θ, y) ∈ F}. The relationships between these functions and the shortage function have 
been analyzed in the literature (Rolf Färe, and Shawna Grosskopf; Robert G. Chambers, Yangho 
Chung, and Rolf Färe). However, by measuring input or output proportions, the Shephard’s 
functions are not additive across firms. As such they do not provide attractive measurements for 
analyzing economies of scope.  
２ Note that, in the case where IB = ∅ and β = 1, this involves no loss of generality since any 
partition of IA can always be decomposed into a series of binary partitions.  
３ Below, the linear programming problem (6) is solved using GAMS software.  
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